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ABSTRACT 
As a landlocked country in East Africa, Uganda faces two major disadvantages 
concerning access to foreign markets.  It does not have an immediate gateway to low-cost 
ocean transport, but first has to pass its imports and exports through neighboring 
countries by road or rail.  Nor does it share a common border with an industrialized 
country that produces the goods and services that Uganda imports and that could absorb a 
large share of the country‟s exports.  In this context it is all the more important to fully 
exploit existing opportunities in regional and global markets, as well as opening new 
export markets by negotiating trade barrier reductions on a preferential or multilateral 
basis.  These trade barrier-related aspects of regional and global market access are 
analyzed in this paper. In particular, the discussion reviews market access policy in 
Uganda and identifies a number of key issues and challenges for the country.   
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1. THE ISSUE OF MARKET ACCESS 
As a landlocked country in East Africa, Uganda faces two major disadvantages 
concerning access to foreign markets.  It does not have an immediate gateway to low-cost ocean 
transport, but first has to pass its imports and exports through neighboring countries by road or 
rail.  Nor does it share a common border with an industrialized country that produces the goods 
and services that Uganda imports and that could absorb a large share of the country‟s exports.  As 
a result and like other landlocked countries in the region that do not have a common border with 
South Africa, Uganda shows a very low degree of trade intensity, as measured by total trade per 
capita (Figure 1). 
Figure 1:  Trade Intensity in Eastern and Southern Africa 
(Imports plus exports per capita, in US Dollars) 
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Note:  Data for 2002.  No comparable information available for Somalia. 
Source:  World Bank, World Development Indicators. 
Uganda has also not been exceptionally successful in attracting foreign direct investment 
(FDI), which is often closely linked to trade in services.  In 2004, Uganda received FDI-inflows 
of 237 million USD, bringing its total FDI stock to 1.6 billion USD, or 23.6 per cent of GDP 
(UNCTAD, 2005).  The country thereby ranks about average in Eastern and Southern Africa and 
slightly below the all-African mean (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2:  Stock of Foreign Direct Investment in Eastern and Southern Africa, 2004 
(Per cent of GDP) 
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Note:  No comparable information available for Somalia. 
Source:  UNCTAD, 2005. 
What can policy makers and development partners do to ameliorate the situation and reap 
larger benefits from increased trade?  Efforts to reduce trade transactions costs through 
streamlining of border procedures and improved transit arrangements are one means.  Such 
measures are discussed extensively in the chapter on transport and trade facilitation.  Another 
avenue consists of trying to more fully exploit existing opportunities in regional and global 
markets as well as opening new export markets by negotiating trade barrier reductions on a 
preferential or multilateral basis.  These trade barrier-related aspects of regional and global 
market access are analyzed in this chapter. 
In particular, the subsequent discussion reviews market access policy in Uganda and 
identifies a number of key issues and challenges for the country.  The analysis falls into three 
parts.  First, the state of regional integration is described, with particular emphasis on the 
prospective effects of the recently concluded East African Community (EAC) customs union.  
Then, Uganda‟s global market opportunities are examined, including an assessment of the degree 
of preference utilization in industrialized country markets.  And finally, some priorities for the 
attention of policy makers and international donors are identified based on the preceding analysis. 
2. ACCESS TO REGIONAL MARKETS 
Like other countries in Eastern and Southern Africa, Uganda is committed to the process 
of regional integration and is pursuing closer ties with neighboring nations.  Indeed, economic 
integration efforts in the region go back by almost a century (Box 1).  Uganda is currently 
engaged in two regional trade agreements, namely the East African Community (EAC) and the 
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Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA).  Moreover, Uganda is a member 
of the Regional Integration Facilitation Forum, and has a number of bilateral agreements, even 
though the latter are not always thoroughly implemented. 
 
Box 1:  History of Regional Integration 
East Africa has a long history of regional integration.  Kenya and Uganda first formed a customs 
union in 1917, which the then Tanganyika (later Tanzania) joined in 1927.  Subsequently, the 
three countries had close economic relationships in the East African High Commission (1948-
1961), the East African Common Services Organization (1961-1967), the East African 
Community (1967-1977), and the East African Co-operation (1993-1999).  In November 1999, 
the Treaty for the establishment of the (new) East African Community was signed, and entered 
into force in July 2000. 
 
The EAC Trade Protocol was signed in March 2004.  After subsequent ratification in national 
Parliaments, the customs union was launched in January 2005, establishing a common external 
tariff and removing all intra-regional trade barriers during a five-year transition period.  Once the 
customs union is completed, the EAC partners envisage further integration steps with the creation 
of a common market, a monetary union, and ultimately a political federation, although no time 
table has been established yet. 
 
Uganda is also an active member of COMESA, which was founded in 1994 to replace the 
region‟s former Preferential Trade Area.  In addition to Uganda, there are 19 other COMESA 
members, namely Angola, Burundi, Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  One of the main objectives of this regional arrangement was 
to establish a free trade area, which was (partly) achieved in October 2000, when nine 
COMESA‟s members (Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Sudan, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe) removed their intra-regional trade barriers.  Burundi and Rwanda joined the free 
trade area in January 2004, bringing the number of participating countries to eleven.  A further 
integration step in the form of the establishment of a customs union, which had originally been 
planned for 2004, has been postponed, as the final structure of the common external tariff has yet 
to be agreed upon.  
 
Additional impetus for regional integration comes from the Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA) negotiations with the European Union.  The Cotonou Agreement signed in 
2000 by the EU and 77 African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) States calls for the establishment 
of economic partnerships between the EU and regional groupings of ACP members based on 
reciprocal market access preferences.  In order to facilitate the negotiation process and to enhance 
the development impact of the agreements through increased intra-regional trade, the EU intends 
the EPAs to be signed with free trade areas or customs unions rather than individual countries.  
Since early 2004, two country groupings for the negotiations have established themselves in 
Eastern and Southern Africa:  the ESA-EPA group of 16 COMESA members, including Uganda, 
and the SADC-EPA group of seven SADC members (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3:  Major Regional Trade Arrangements in Eastern and Southern Africa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  World Bank Staff. 
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2.1 Importance of Formal and Informal Trade within the Region 
According to official statistics, the value of total trade (imports plus exports) amounted to 
about 34 per cent of Uganda‟s GDP in 2004 (Table 1).  About a third of this total was carried out 
with other countries in Eastern or Southern Africa, up from a quarter a decade earlier.  Most of 
the regional trade occurred under preferential market access conditions within COMESA or EAC.  
Trade with SADC-only countries, i.e. countries in the region that are neither members of 
COMESA nor EAC, such as South Africa, amounted to 2.2 per cent of GDP. 
Regional trade in manufactured products is relatively more important than regional trade 
in agricultural commodities.  This is due to a significant share of Uganda‟s manufactured imports 
originating in other countries in the region, notably Kenya and South Africa.  For agricultural 
products, Uganda has a trade surplus vis-à-vis Eastern and Southern Africa, which in 2004 
exceeded the corresponding surplus with the Rest of the World. 
Table 1:  Structure of Uganda’s Merchandise Trade within the Region 
(per cent of gross domestic product) 
  Total trade Exports Imports Net-Exports 
  1994 1999 2004 1994 1999 2004 1994 1999 2004 1994 1999 2004 
All Goods              
World  28.3 25.5 33.6 11.3 8.5 9.4 17.1 17.0 24.2 -5.8 -8.5 -14.9 
- Africa  6.9 8.0 11.0 1.5 2.6 3.2 5.4 5.4 7.9 -3.8 -2.7 -4.7 
- Countries in  E & S Africa 6.9 7.7 10.7 1.5 2.3 2.9 5.4 5.3 7.8 -3.8 -3.0 -4.9 
 COMESA 6.5 5.9 8.1 1.5 1.7 2.6 5.0 4.2 5.5 -3.5 -2.5 -2.9 
 ESA-EPA 6.4 5.7 7.7 1.5 1.6 2.5 5.0 4.1 5.2 -3.5 -2.6 -2.6 
 EAC 5.4 4.9 6.6 0.5 0.6 1.3 4.9 4.2 5.3 -4.4 -3.6 -4.0 
 SADC only 0.2 1.5 2.2 0.0 0.6 0.1 0.2 1.0 2.1 -0.1 -0.4 -1.9 
- Other Africa  0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 
- Rest of World  21.4 17.5 22.6 9.7 5.8 6.2 11.7 11.6 16.4 -2.0 -5.8 -10.2 
Agriculture (HS 1-24)             
World  13.3 9.4 10.2 10.6 7.0 6.1 2.8 2.4 4.1 7.8 4.5 1.9 
- Africa  2.4 2.3 2.6 1.2 1.8 1.8 1.1 0.6 0.7 0.1 1.2 1.1 
- Countries in  E & S Africa 2.4 2.1 2.5 1.2 1.5 1.8 1.1 0.6 0.7 0.1 1.0 1.0 
 COMESA 2.3 1.7 2.1 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.1 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.9 1.2 
 ESA-EPA 2.3 1.6 2.0 1.2 1.2 1.6 1.1 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.8 1.2 
 EAC 1.4 0.8 1.2 0.4 0.4 0.8 1.0 0.4 0.4 -0.6 0.0 0.4 
 SADC only 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 
- Other Africa  0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 
- Rest of World  11.0 7.1 7.7 9.3 5.2 4.3 1.7 1.9 3.4 7.7 3.3 0.8 
Manufacturing (HS 25-99)             
World  15.0 16.1 23.4 0.7 1.5 3.3 14.3 14.6 20.1 -13.6 -13.1 -16.8 
- Africa  4.6 5.7 8.5 0.3 0.9 1.3 4.3 4.8 7.1 -4.0 -3.9 -5.8 
- Countries in  E & S Africa 4.5 5.6 8.3 0.3 0.8 1.2 4.3 4.8 7.1 -4.0 -3.9 -5.9 
 COMESA 4.2 4.2 6.1 0.3 0.4 1.0 3.9 3.8 5.1 -3.7 -3.4 -4.1 
 ESA-EPA 4.1 4.1 5.8 0.3 0.4 1.0 3.9 3.7 4.8 -3.6 -3.4 -3.8 
 EAC 4.1 4.0 5.4 0.1 0.2 0.5 3.9 3.8 4.9 -3.8 -3.6 -4.4 
 SADC only 0.2 1.2 1.9 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.2 0.8 1.9 -0.1 -0.4 -1.8 
- Other Africa  0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
- Rest of World  10.4 10.4 14.9 0.4 0.6 2.0 10.0 9.8 13.0 -9.6 -9.1 -11.0 
Note:  E & S Africa is taken as all countries that are members of COMESA or SADC.  Regional Trade Blocs 
(COMESA, ESA-EPA, EAC) are aggregated from individual country data according to the membership 
structure as of January 2005 (see figure 3).  “SADC only” refers to Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, 
Namibia, and South Africa. 
Source:  UN COMTRADE database. 
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Uganda has been running trade deficits with its two EAC partners, Kenya and Tanzania.  
In 2004, these amounted to 3.2 million USD vis-à-vis Tanzania and a more substantial 
267 million USD vis-à-vis Kenya (Table 2).  Uganda is a net exporter of agricultural products and 
electricity to both of its partners, but imports large quantities of manufactures. 
 
Table 2:  Structure of Uganda’s Trade with its EAC Partners, 2004 
(„000 USD) 
ISIC-3 Sector Kenya Tanzania 
Code Description Total 
trade 
Ex- 
ports 
Im- 
ports 
Net 
trade 
Total 
trade 
Ex- 
ports 
Im- 
ports 
Net 
trade 
01 Agriculture & hunting  26060 21630 4431 17199 5348 2810 2537 273 
02 Forestry & logging  17 0 17 -17 0 0 0 0 
05 Fishing 1 0 1 -1 1 0 1 -1 
10 Mining of coal and lignite 12 0 12 -12 0 0 0 0 
11 Crude petroleum and natural gas 2736 0 2736 -2736 0 0 0 0 
14 Other mining and quarrying 9772 51 9721 -9670 0 0 0 0 
15 Food products and beverages 50173 31846 18327 13519 1830 903 927 -24 
16 Tobacco products 37 0 37 -37 7  7 -7 
17 Textiles 9843 2280 7563 -5283 1786 1193 592 601 
18 Wearing apparel & fur 1771 1 1770 -1769 8 4 3 1 
19 Leather & footwear 3636 128 3507 -3379 136 0 136 -136 
20 Wood except furniture 829 13 816 -803 280 7 273 -266 
21 Paper and paper products 18118 85 18032 -17947 225 148 78 70 
22 Publishing & printing  1941 12 1928 -1916 26 13 13 0 
23 Coke & refined petroleum  155055 5 155049 -155044 510 2 508 -505 
24 Chemicals and chemical products 39473 1242 38231 -36990 1062 957 106 851 
25 Rubber and plastics products 9463 207 9256 -9049 633 496 137 359 
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 24396 5 24391 -24385 1104 98 1007 -909 
27 Basic metals 18570 778 17793 -17015 8537 945 7592 -6647 
28 Fabricated metal products 7474 159 7315 -7157 55 45 9 36 
29 Machinery and equipment 8875 2277 6597 -4320 766 370 395 -25 
30 Office & computing machinery 1422 329 1093 -763 261 175 86 89 
31 Electrical machinery and apparatus  3051 16 3035 -3020 117 61 56 5 
32 Radio, communication equipment  2375 1687 688 999 147 64 82 -18 
33 Medical & optical instruments 1073 19 1053 -1034 3 1 2 -2 
34 Motor vehicles & trailers  9914 2987 6927 -3940 288 248 41 207 
35 Other transport equipment 1633 511 1123 -612 36 36 0 36 
36 Furniture 2612 111 2501 -2389 204 196 8 189 
40 Electricity, gas, and hot water supply 8969 8967 2 8964 3107 3107 0 3107 
 Other activities 1608 1377 231 1146 1003 268 734 -466 
 Total 420906 76723 344183 -267460 27477 12147 15330 -3183 
Source:  UN COMTRADE database. 
 
The trade balance with regional partners improves if informal cross-border transactions 
are taken into consideration.  The Uganda Bureau of Statistics monitored small-scale trade at 
border crossings that is not subject to customs regulations during the period from October 2003 to 
January 2004.  The authorities tolerate shipments by bicycle or wheelbarrow of up to 200 kg as 
not requiring official registration, so that traders can avoid the (relatively low) EAC or COMESA 
tariffs and other direct and indirect taxes that apply only to formal businesses.  Enumerators were 
stationed at border posts with all of Uganda‟s five neighbours, i.e. DR Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, 
Sudan, and Tanzania.  They recorded both informal export and import transactions at the border 
posts and made estimates on the extent to which informal transactions took place in the post‟s 
vicinity (UBOS, 2004). 
The results indicate that the volume of informal trade is significant and that Uganda‟s 
informal exports exceed informal imports by a substantial margin.  Informal exports to the five 
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partner countries corresponded to about half of formal trade, while informal imports amount to 
less than five per cent of the value of imports reported in official statistics.  The informal trade 
surplus over the four month survey period from October 2003 to January 2004 was estimated to 
amount to 19.1 million USD.  The loss in government revenue over this period due to non-
collection of import tariffs and value-added taxes is estimated to amount to about 1 million USD 
(UBOS, 2004).  Informal cross-border transactions are bound to persist even if tariffs are reduced 
to zero, such as envisaged between Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania after the EAC transition period, 
because the fiscal disincentive related to becoming a formal business, including liability for 
value-added and other taxes, will remain.  Hence, the toleration of informal trade transactions will 
continue to lead to revenue slippage. 
The importance of informal transactions varies considerably across the countries 
neighbouring Uganda.  Informal trade with DR Congo and Kenya is quite substantial, while 
informal transactions are only of minor significance for Uganda‟s trade relations with Rwanda, 
Sudan, and Tanzania (Figure 4).  According to the UBOS study, Uganda has informal trade 
surpluses with all its five neighbours and in each case for both agricultural and manufacturing 
products.  The positive informal trade balance for manufactures with Kenya is particularly 
remarkable, since for official trade, Uganda runs a very large trade deficit with that country.  
However, further verification of the extent of informal cross-border transactions seems desirable, 
since earlier surveys conducted during the mid-1990s found a substantial deficit in informal trade 
of manufactures for Uganda with Kenya (Ackello-Ogutu and Echessah, 1997), so that the 
findings to date should be treated with care. 
Figure 4:  Uganda’s Formal and Informal Trade with its Neighbors, 2004 
(in million US Dollars) 
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Note:  Informal trade estimates should be treated with care, as the trade volumes for the four month study 
period of October 2003 to January 2004 were extrapolated to the full year 2004. 
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Source:  UN COMTRADE database, and UBOS, 2004. 
While the product composition of informal trade varies across partner countries, the 
overall most important agricultural commodities that are traded informally are maize and beans.  
For manufactured products, shoes, bitenge, and used clothes feature prominently.  A substantial 
part of the latter represents re-exports, as Uganda receives large amounts of used clothing from 
developed countries.  The unit values of informally traded commodities were found to be lower 
than those observed in formal trade, suggesting that the products that go through informal 
channels might be of inferior quality.  This finding, again, merits further investigation and year-
round monitoring of cross-border transactions, for example, would make it possible to capture 
seasonal variations in pricing and trade flows and gain valuable information to complement 
official trade statistics. 
2.2 Economic Effects of Regional Initiatives 
Economic integration at the regional level can make it possible to reap benefits from 
international trade, while tailoring the provisions of the agreement to the particular needs and 
adjustment capacities of the countries involved.  In the short term, regional integration will entail 
adjustment needs, as prices on the domestic market change in response to tariff reforms.  Such 
structural adjustments are to be expected as a result of Uganda‟s most recent and most far-
reaching regional integration step, i.e. the formation of the EAC. 
2.2.1 The EAC Tariff Regime 
Uganda changed its structure of domestic market protection when joining the customs 
union with Kenya and Tanzania in January 2005.  Tariff rates were adjusted to the level of the 
common external tariff and the previously existing import commission fees of two per cent were 
discontinued, while intra-regional trade barriers will be phased out.  In particular, the arrangement 
calls for Kenya to eliminate all tariffs on imports from Uganda and Tanzania, and for Uganda and 
Tanzania to eliminate tariffs on each other‟s imports.  Regarding imports from Kenya, Uganda 
and Tanzania will eliminate tariffs on all imports except for an agreed-on list of products for 
which the tariff will be gradually reduced to zero over a period of five years.  The asymmetry in 
liberalizing intra-regional trade is intended to give Tanzania and Uganda, which are less 
developed and have a large trade deficit with Kenya, additional time to initiate structural 
adjustments.  Uganda‟s list contains 443 products, which are subject to import tariffs of 10 per 
cent in 2005 that will be reduced to zero in five annual steps.  With this 10 per cent import duty, 
Kenyan exporters of listed products face (temporarily) higher import barriers in 2005 under EAC 
preferences than they used to under COMESA preferences in 2004.   
The agreed common external tariff has an escalatory three-band structure, with a zero rate 
for raw materials, capital goods, and meritorious goods, such as medical, pharmaceutical and 
educational supplies; a 10 per cent rate for intermediate goods, and a 25 per cent maximum rate 
for finished goods.  The customs union protocol provides for a revision of the top rate five years 
after the customs union entered into force, and it is expected that the top rate will at that point be 
reduced to 20 per cent.  Almost 40 per cent of all tariff lines are subject to the maximum rate 
(Table 3). 
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Table 3:  The EAC Common External Tariff 
Category  Number of tariff lines Ad valorem tariff (per cent) 
Items in zero band  1927 0 
- of which:  Meritorious goods 105 0 
 Raw materials  1111 0 
 Capital Goods 711 0 
Intermediate goods  1159 10 
Finished goods  1886 25 
Source:  World Bank Staff. 
 
In the negotiations on the formation of the customs union, the three EAC partners agreed 
on a list of 56 sensitive products to which “special tariffs” apply.  About a fifth of the latter are 
combined duties, consisting of an ad valorem and a specific element, which can yield significant 
protection for domestic producers.  The ad valorem tariffs range from 35 to 100 per cent, with the 
highest duties applying to sugar imports.  Other sensitive products include milk, grains, 
cigarettes, kitenge, and used clothing.  Since for most of the sensitive products, the special tariffs 
exceed the previously existing national import duties, adverse economic effects, notably higher 
consumer prices, are likely.  Some analysts point out that it seems questionable whether regional 
producers will be able to increase production or offer substitutes in comparable quantity, quality 
and price to offset the protection-induced reduction in third country imports (Stahl, 2005).  
Higher prices will notably hit consumers on low incomes, who depend for their livelihood heavily 
on the basic products included in the sensitive list.  An aggravating factor is that these regressive 
effects will be felt most intensively in the relatively poorer EAC partners, above all in Uganda, in 
the view of the country‟s relative low import protection prior to EAC formation.  In this context, 
the government of Uganda should press its partners to establish a timetable that calls for the 
imminent phase-out of the special tariffs. 
As a result of the adoption of the common external tariff, the listed average duty rate 
(including excise duties and import commissions in 2004) increased from 11.3 per cent to 
12.3 per cent.  This increase in protection affected both agricultural and manufactured products.  
The tariff regime is escalatory by granting higher protection to processed products than to raw 
materials.  This tariff escalation generates effective rates of protection (ERPs) that exceeds 
nominal tariff protection for producers that have access to inputs at low-tariff rates, while being 
able to shield behind high import barriers for their final products.  By taking into account 
protection on both outputs and inputs, ERPs provide a better representation of tariff-generated 
transfers to producers than nominal rates of protection (NRPs), which are based on protection of 
outputs only.   
In some sectors in Uganda, ERPs exceed NRPs substantially and reach levels of up to 
100 per cent (Table 4).  Also, ERPs show a larger variation across sectors than NRPs, implying 
significant differences in production incentives due to the structure of tariff protection.  For most 
sectors, both NRPs and ERPs increased in 2005 with the adoption of the CET.  The highest 
protection is granted to producers in agro-industry, beverages, and textiles.   
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Table 4:  Nominal and Effective Rates of Protection in Uganda’s Manufacturing Sector 
  Nominal rate of protection Effective rate of protection 
  2002 2005 (CET) 2002 2005 (CET) 
Agroindustry  20.5 42.1 27.1 59.5 
Bakery  13.2 24.2 13.4 11.9 
Beverages  25.7 25.0 102.6 96.7 
Chemicals & Paints  19.7 23.2 26.9 28.0 
Construction Materials  13.3 15.5 13.9 15.7 
Furniture  16.1 24.9 17.1 32.9 
Metals  14.6 18.4 16.0 23.5 
Machinery  0.9 1.5 -9.9 -8.1 
Paper, Printing, Publishing  17.3 17.6 20.7 14.6 
Textiles  15.0 25.0 50.8 91.9 
Garments  15.0 25.2 11.0 33.4 
Wood  23.9 23.7 26.4 26.6 
Miscellaneous  23.4 26.6 27.9 32.4 
Repair & Maintenance Services  16.9 22.3 18.8 38.4 
Notes:  Data based on findings of a survey of 228 manufacturing firms.  Nominal rates of protection reflect 
tariffs plus discriminatory excise duties as listed in the tariff schedule. 
Source:  Rajhi, Marchat and Webster, 2005. 
 
Domestic market protection comes at a cost, notably to consumers and firms that source 
their inputs domestically.  Also, tariff protection introduces an anti-export bias.  If firms produce 
for the export market, they do not receive the same market price support that producers for the 
domestic market enjoy.  Uganda operates a duty drawback system, which makes it possible for 
exporters to claim back the duty and value-added tax paid on inputs of exported products.  This 
arrangement thus neutralizes the effects of tariff and tax policy for exporting firms, if the duty 
refunds are indeed paid in a timely manner.  Yet, the arrangement does not generate the 
significant policy-generated transfers that producers for the domestic market obtain, thus biasing 
producers‟ decisions against selling abroad.  Indeed, the higher the domestic market protection is, 
the stronger the anti-export bias becomes.  The EAC customs union protocol provides for a 
revision of the top CET rate five years after the customs union entered into force, and it seems in 
the interest of Uganda to ask its partners for a reduction in the highest-band duty from 25 to 
20 per cent.  
 
2.2.2 The impact of EAC integration 
How is the increased domestic market protection going to affect firms, workers and 
consumers in Uganda?  The impact depends on how different economic forces play out (Box 2).  
In the short term, econometric analysis based on firm-level data suggests that the adoption of the 
EAC‟s common external tariff by Uganda will overall change profit margins, productivity, wages 
and employment only slightly (Table 5).  The predicted effects are not uniform across sectors, 
though, as the changes in input and output prices differ, with the metals and textiles sectors being 
generally subject to more pronounced impacts.  However, these findings should be treated with 
care, as the estimates are not always statistically significant. 
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Table 5:  Short-Term Impacts of the Adoption of the Common External Tariff in Uganda 
(change in per cent) 
Sector Price-Cost Margin Productivity Employment Wages 
Agro-industry -0.39 -0.85 0.70 0.19 
Chemicals and Paints -0.22 -0.63 0.63 0.00 
Construction Materials -0.46 -0.63 0.37 0.13 
Metals -1.35 -1.80 0.73 0.21 
Paper and Publishing -0.73 -0.55 0.73 0.19 
Textiles and Leather -1.85 5.70 0.62 0.37 
Note:  Calculations based on listed overall average tariffs. 
Source:  Rajhi, Marchat and Webster, 2005. 
 
In the case of the EAC, the positive short-term employment and wage effects from higher 
protection against third country exports are to some extent counterbalanced by reduced protection 
vis-à-vis the customs union partners.  The phase-out of intra-EAC trade barriers has indeed given 
rise to concerns that Ugandan manufacturing firms might find themselves in a difficult situation 
versus their more developed and more sophisticated competitors from Kenya.  Analysis using 
firm-level data to derive competitiveness indicators shows a mixed picture, though (Siggel and 
Ssemogerere, 2004).  Ugandan manufacturing firms, although not generally cost-competitive with 
Kenyan companies, have benefited from the recently established more business-friendly 
environment and are more competitive in several industries than is generally assumed.  The 
analysts claim that Ugandan firms may not be able to export internationally, but that they are 
likely to hold their ground against Kenyan imports under regional free trade.  According to the 
study, industries that have an advantage in Uganda are fish processing, auto batteries and 
footwear, whereas Kenyan industries are relatively more competitive in dairy production, grain 
milling, textile & clothing and metal products. 
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Box 2:  Welfare impacts of regional integration initiatives 
The overall welfare consequence of regional integration depend on several factors.  If the 
reduction of intra-regional trade barriers fosters partner countries to expand output and exports of 
products for which they are internationally competitive, the price of final goods or production 
inputs on the importing country market falls to the benefit of consumers and input-purchasing 
producers.  In this case, welfare-enhancing trade is created. 
Moreover, regional trade initiatives can have beneficial indirect effects.  Opening domestic 
markets to partner countries, for example, can increase competition in sectors with previously 
highly concentrated industrial structures and thereby reduce the monopolistic pricing power of 
incumbents.  Such pro-competitive impacts are particularly important for countries like Uganda 
that have only a nascent domestic competition policy.Also, regional cooperation can be effective 
in harmonizing customs procedures and domestic regulations.  Adopting common rules on 
investment, for example, has the potential to encourage increased inflows of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) by enhancing the credibility of FDI-policies and providing a restraint on sudden 
policy reversals.   
Some observers justify RTAs in political economy terms by seeing them as laboratories for 
international integration, training grounds for negotiations at a broader level, and strategic means 
of trade policy making.  By teaming up with regional partners, countries may be able to increase 
the weight of their positions in international trade negotiations and possibly achieve more 
favorable negotiation outcomes.  Also, regional trade agreements make it possible for countries to 
gain some control over the trade policy of their partner countries. 
Conversely, engaging in RTAs implies passing parts of a country‟s sovereignty on to the regional 
bloc.  For example, as a result of joining the EAC customs union, Uganda can no longer freely 
decide on its level of import duties, but depends on consensus with Kenya and Tanzania to pursue 
changes to the common external tariff.  Hence, the institutional framework for trade policy 
making changes. 
Furthermore, RTAs may result in losses of government revenues, as tariffs on intra-regional trade 
are phased out, or promote costly trade diversion rather than welfare-enhancing trade creation, if 
trade is shifted from efficient producers outside the RTA to preferential trading partners that 
produce at higher costs.  In this case, the government loses tariff revenue on imports from third 
countries, without domestic producers benefiting to a corresponding extent from lower import 
prices.  The risk for trade diversion to occur is particularly high if MFN tariffs remain high and 
trade with partner countries accounts for only a small share of overall trade (World Bank, 2004). 
A recent review of studies on the trade and welfare effects of customs unions concluded that the 
elimination of intra-regional trade barriers between small developing countries is likely to 
generate mostly trade diversion and little trade creation, unless significant reductions in MFN-
tariffs accompany the regional integration efforts (Schiff and Winters, 2003).   
In relation to third countries, the formation of the EAC customs union and the adoption of 
the common external tariff led to modest average MFN-tariff increases.  Analysis using a partial 
equilibrium model that takes into account the response of producers and consumers to tariff and 
price changes following customs union formation suggests that imports into Uganda from EAC 
partners would increase by 0.15 per cent compared to 2002-levels with temporary tariffs on 
imports from Kenya in place and would grow by 6.1 per cent following the complete phase-out of 
intra-regional tariffs (Castro, Kraus, and de la Rocha, 2004).  Imports from third countries would 
decrease, respectively, by 1.3 per cent and 3.3 per cent.  Overall, a fall in imports by 0.9 per cent 
is projected (both with and without temporary tariffs).  Customs revenues are expected to fall by 
2.9 per cent with temporary tariffs on imports from Kenya and by 8.6 per cent without these 
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transitory duties.  The largest share of revenue losses is caused by declining tariff revenues on 
imports of crude materials and chemicals (Table 6). 
The projection that trade with EAC partners increases while imports from third countries 
decrease suggests that the trade policy changes that were undertaken (liberalization of intra EAC 
trade plus adoption of a common external tariff) are likely to lead overall to welfare-decreasing 
trade diversion for Uganda.  This finding is at broadly confirmed by an earlier study that used a 
computable general equilibrium model to assess to economic effects of EAC formation (DeRosa, 
Obwona, and Roningen, 2002).  DeRosa et al. project economic welfare losses for Uganda due to 
trade diversion as the country‟s average MFN-tariffs increase with the adoption of the CET.  
They argue further that Uganda faces the danger of reduced industry competitiveness due to the 
EAC‟s higher tariff protection for the country‟s nascent import competing industries, which 
reduces the incentive to innovate, bring down production costs, and improve marketing 
capabilities.  They see the economic growth momentum that Uganda has enjoyed since the mid-
1990s as a result of trade and macroeconomic reforms (Hinkle, Herrou-Aragon and Krishnamani, 
2004) thereby being partially undermined.  As a remedy, they recommend for Uganda to strive 
for lower external tariffs in the EAC.   
 
Table 6: Customs Revenue Change following CET Adoption by Sector 
   Change in customs revenue 
   million USD  Per Cent of 2002-
revenues 
Food and live animals   2.0 1.09 
Beverages and tobacco   0.0 0.01 
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels   -4.7 -2.47 
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials   -0.5 -0.28 
Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes   -1.6 -0.88 
Chemicals and related products.   -2.5 -1.34 
Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material   -1.0 -0.56 
Machinery and transport equipment   1.2 0.67 
Miscellaneous manufactured articles   1.8 0.96 
Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere    0.0 0.00 
Total   -5.3 -2.90 
Note:  Estimates assuming that temporary tariffs on imports from Kenya are in place. 
Source:  Castro, Kraus, and de la Rocha, 2004. 
 
2.2.3 The impact of COMESA integration 
In parallel to developments in the EAC, COMESA has been furthering its regional 
integration efforts, including negotiations on a prospective common external tariff.  Uganda has 
had and still has a relatively liberal trade regime by regional standards, and increases in protection 
under a hypothetical COMESA-arrangement would likely lead to losses in international 
competitiveness and economic welfare.  The discussion on the prospective COMESA-CET have 
not yet been finalized, but top rates of up to 40 per cent are under consideration, and sensitive 
products might receive even higher protection (COMESA, 2005).  Hence, COMESA integration 
bears risks for Uganda.   
Moreover, the production and trade structures of countries in Eastern and Southern Africa 
are not particularly complementary (Khandelwal, 2004).  Similarities between the export basket 
of one country and the import basket of another can be analyzed by using the bilateral product 
complementarity index.  The value of this index can range from zero, which represents no 
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complementarity between exports and imports of two countries, to one hundred, which implies a 
perfect match.  The higher the index between two countries, the greater the product 
complementarity. 
On the importing side, Uganda shows high complementary with Egypt and Kenya, and 
moderately high values for exports to Mauritius, Seychelles, and Egypt (Table 7).  But for most 
country pairings, the values for COMESA complementarity fall short of those for well 
established, successful regional trade initiatives, such as the European Union (index value of 
53.4) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (56.3).  The potential for beneficial trade 
exchange within the region, hence, seems limited, while high external trade barriers suggest a 
substantial risk of trade diversion to occur. 
 
Table 7:  Bilateral Complementarity Indices in COMESA, 2003 
 Importer 
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Exporter 
Burundi 
… 5.2 9.6 1.7 3.6 3.7 5.6 3.0 4.9 9.8 5.3 3.8 2.0 2.4 
Comoros 4.4 … 8.8 4.6 5.5 5.2 5.0 5.2 4.8 12.3 7.2 5.4 4.8 5.9 
Egypt 42.1 24.0 … 46.4 44.5 44.4 45.8 52.1 46.3 29.4 35.0 46.6 38.7 63.9 
Ethiopia 5.2 7.7 15.4 … 5.8 5.3 9.5 8.0 8.8 12.5 9.9 6.2 5.1 3.6 
Kenya 37.8 23.6 33.8 40.2 … 44.0 38.5 47.1 44.1 31.6 32.1 41.9 35.3 51.3 
Malawi 7.1 7.7 13.8 7.6 7.8 … 9.3 7.9 10.3 14.0 12.1 9.1 8.1 6.6 
Mauritius 10.3 9.1 13.6 10.3 9.9 11.3 … 11.6 11.6 15.6 11.1 12.0 10.3 8.9 
Madagascar 17.4 13.4 22.2 14.0 15.5 18.9 38.8 … 19.6 24.6 18.6 18.4 17.2 13.9 
Rwanda 1.9 1.5 6.8 1.6 2.5 2.2 2.5 1.8 … 9.1 4.9 2.0 1.9 2.6 
Seychelles 4.4 2.4 11.4 3.1 3.3 2.7 6.7 3.4 3.2 … 3.4 2.8 3.4 3.5 
Sudan 16.1 8.2 14.0 20.4 20.6 21.2 20.6 28.5 17.2 13.6 … 19.3 12.4 45.8 
Uganda 17.7 17.3 24.8 17.8 17.9 21.1 25.8 19.1 19.3 25.1 21.1 … 17.7 14.8 
Zambia 11.4 12.1 17.8 11.3 12.0 12.9 19.3 12.2 15.0 18.6 12.8 12.3 … 11.9 
Zimbabwe 13.9 12.5 16.8 10.5 10.8 14.0 18.4 10.5 14.3 14.1 14.2 14.2 9.1 … 
Note:  The product complementarity index Cjk between two countries j and k is defined as Cjk = 100 - 
∑i(|Mik-Xij|/2), where Xij represents the share of good i in total exports of country j and Mik represents the 
share of good in total imports of country k.  Indices for Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Djibouti, and Eritrea were not computed because of lack of data. 
Source:  Khandelwal, 2004. 
 
While further quantitative analysis of the economic effects of regional integration 
initiatives in Eastern and Southern Africa seems warranted, the available evidence suggests that 
there is considerable uncertainty about whether the existing regional agreements are in the best 
economic interest of Uganda and its partner countries in the region.  The authorities should try to 
maximize the benefits from Uganda‟s RTAs by pursuing deeper integration through 
harmonization of trade standards and behind-the-border regulations.  In parallel, the Government 
should follow a paradigm of open regionalisms by continuing to push for lower external trade 
barriers in order to counter the risk of trade diversion.  RTAs should generally be seen as a means 
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of economic cooperation that can contribute to the achievement of the country‟s overall 
development strategy, but that can not be a substitute for continuing domestic policy reform and 
multilateral trade liberalization. 
2.3 Overlapping Membership in Regional Agreements 
EAC and COMESA are not the only regional integration initiatives in Eastern and 
Southern Africa.  In fact, there are four major regional trade arrangements in this part of the 
world and almost all countries in the region have become members of several agreements, 
creating a regional configurations of overlapping preferential arrangements (Figure 3).  Some 
observers argue that countries could maximize the benefits from regional integration by 
participating in several arrangements simultaneously (Lyakurwa at al., 1997).  Liberalizing trade 
within smaller groups facilitates the coordination and harmonization of national policies, and 
makes it possible to increase competition for sensitive domestic industries at a more measured 
pace.  Multiple agreements also open up alternative liberalization tracks that provide countries 
with flexibility to switch their integration focus in the event that progress within a particular 
grouping were to stall.  Moreover, since aid agencies frequently provide funds for region-wide 
projects, participation in multiple regional arrangements might be seen as a means to fully exploit 
the potential pool of donor-funds. 
On the other hand, there are significant drawbacks.  Since each of the agreements 
involves different partners, different rules of origin, different tariff schedules, and different 
implementation periods, effectively administrating the multiple regional integration efforts can 
pose major political and technical challenges and increase trade transactions costs.  These 
consequences from overlapping agreements are bound to intensify as many of the existing 
arrangements are scheduled to deepen their integration by moving from preferential agreements 
to free trade areas or customs unions. 
Multiple membership of overlapping RTAs creates demanding requirements in several 
respects.  In the private sector, traders have to operate within different trade regimes, each with its 
own tariff rates, regulations and procedures.  For example, non-coordination amongst regional 
arrangements concerning transit bonds has been cited by private sector representatives as a 
significant impediment (Charalambides, 2005).  In the border services, customs officials have to 
deal with different rules of origin, trade documentation, and statistical nomenclatures, thereby 
multiplying internal procedures and paperwork.  And on the political level, negotiating and 
serving different regional initiatives can absorb large amounts of scarce administrative resources 
and occupy policymakers‟ attention to a considerable extent.  This concerns, in particular, the 
preparation, attendance, and follow-up of meetings of technical experts or ministers.  At times, 
integration efforts are duplicated and counterproductive competition between countries and 
regional institutions – including with respect to dispute resolution – can emerge (UNECA, 2004).  
In addition, budgetary contributions from member states towards the administration costs of the 
various RTAs can be a significant burden, as indicated by the cumulative (annual) arrears in 
membership contributions in SADC and COMESA (Kritzinger-van Niekerk and Moreira, 2002). 
2.3.1 Conflicting Integration Schemes 
Potentially conflicting integration schemes as a result of simultaneous participation in 
several regional trade agreements are another major drawback.  Such contradictory requirements 
indeed have the potential to create serious dilemmas for trade policy makers in Uganda and its 
EAC partners.  As discussed earlier, Uganda and Kenya are members of COMESA, but not of 
SADC, while Tanzania is a member of SADC, but not of COMESA.  This asymmetric 
configuration is creating confusing and conflicting situations, which are bound to intensify over 
time as the respective integration agendas of EAC, SADC and COMESA are deepening.  In 
particular, the EAC customs union came into effect in January 2005 and both COMESA and 
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SADC are also hoping to form customs unions in the medium-term future.  Since one country can 
not realistically apply two different common external tariffs, let alone implement the customs and 
fiscal integration (e.g. revenue-sharing) that are basic components of fully functioning customs 
unions, Uganda and its EAC partners are sooner or later bound to face the choice about which 
agreement they want to go with. 
Another type of problem from overlapping RTA-membership relates to conflicting 
commitments and potential trade deflection.  The COMESA Treaty (Article 56.2) states that 
“Nothing in this Treaty shall prevent a Member State from maintaining or entering into new 
preferential agreements with third countries provided such agreements do not impede or frustrate 
the objectives of this Treaty and that any advantage, concession, privilege and favour granted to a 
third country under such agreements are extended to the Member States on a reciprocal basis.”  
The SADC Trade Protocol (Article XXVIII, paragraph 2) contains a similar provision  Since 
upon joining the EAC customs union, Uganda (and Kenya) granted market access preferences to 
Tanzania that exceed those given to its COMESA partners, the literal reading of the provisions 
implies the requirement to extend the EAC free intra-regional trade benefits also to all COMESA 
and SADC countries. 
Yet, after deliberating on the matter, the EAC Council decided not to extend the EAC 
market access benefits to other COMESA and SADC partners.  However, the EAC members 
were allowed to continue with their existing obligations to SADC and COMESA and imports 
from the respective countries were exempted from the EAC‟s common external tariff.  This 
continuation of member-specific preferences within the customs union could result in trade 
deflection, unless border controls are maintained for strict intra-EAC policing of trade, notably 
verification of rules of origin.  Otherwise, Egyptian traders, for example, could export goods to 
Uganda under COMESA preferences and the local importers could then ship them duty free on to 
Tanzania under the EAC regime.  Conversely, SADC members could use Tanzania as a transit 
route to Kenya and Uganda.  To counter any unintended extension of preferences, border controls 
will need to continue.  Indeed, as long as the situation of overlapping membership remains, the 
EAC will not be able to become a fully functioning customs union and its members will not be 
able to reap the benefits of free internal movement of goods. 
Over the past years, SADC, COMESA and the EAC have been working more closely 
together in areas such as regional trade analysis, capacity building, and transport facilitation.  So 
far the economic integration schedules and the move towards freer intra-regional trade have not 
resulted in any major inconsistencies.  Yet, the formation of the EAC customs union and the 
possibly resulting problems of trade deflection highlight the emerging integration conflicts, as the 
individual trade initiatives deepen their status.   
2.3.2 Rules of Origin 
One issue that deserves particular attention in the context of overlapping agreements is 
the potentially significant trade transactions costs that can result from the need to comply with 
multiple rules of origin (ROO) regulations (Brenton and Imagawa, 2004).  Preferential trading 
agreements use ROOs to ensure that third countries do not unduly benefit from the preferential 
treatment that members of a RTA grant to one another.  They specify the amount of processing 
that a product must undergo in partner countries in order to quality for market access under the 
preferential agreement.  These rules can add considerable complexity to the trading process and 
augment the costs of international trade, in particular if the ROOs vary across different 
agreements.   
When designing their customs union, the partner countries in the EAC agreed on rules of 
origin that represent a negotiating compromise between the prevailing arrangements in COMESA 
and SADC and do not correspond to either of the previously existing arrangements.  The EAC-
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ROO are to a large extent based on the ROO used in COMESA, which specify a local value 
addition requirement of 35 per cent or a change in tariff heading.  But for a number of tariff lines, 
more complex, sector and product-specific SADC rules of origin, which are more restrictive and 
more difficult to handle, were adopted.  This situation with different rules of origin in EAC, 
SADC, and COMESA may pose problems for firms in EAC members that want to trade with 
neighboring countries and force them to adjust their production or trade operations.  For example, 
firms might be compelled to focus on only certain export destinations, given that they might need 
to produce differently in order to receive preferential access in different foreign markets. 
Moreover, companies not only have to comply with the rules on sufficient domestic 
processing, but also need to obtain a certificate from the competent authorities that proves 
compliance.  Within North America, the costs of providing appropriate documentation to prove 
origin have been estimated to amount to as much as 3 per cent of import value (Anson et al., 
2005).  These costs might well be even higher for small-scale firms in developing countries that 
do not have sophisticated accounting procedures in place in order to keep track of the 
geographical origin of their production inputs.  If such firms are then confronted with ROOs that 
vary across different agreements, the effort of showing compliance can become prohibitively 
expensive. 
Strict and complex ROO might also inhibit firms to integrate into global or regional 
production networks.  Indeed, it has been argued that ROO can be trade diverting and can 
“export” protection from one trading partner, who imposes strict ROO, to another, who adjusts 
local production patterns accordingly (Krueger, 1997).  In particular, producers faced with 
restrictive ROOs and the prospect of benefiting from preferential tariffs might well turn away 
from low-cost, third country suppliers of intermediate inputs and towards highly protected, high-
cost suppliers located in the partner country, thereby increasing their production costs and making 
them less competitive in the global market (Krishna and Krueger, 1995). 
Multiple origin schemes also place a burden on the administrative capacity of the 
customs services.  A recent world-wide survey of customs agencies in member countries of the 
World Customs Organization sought information on the role of customs in issuing and checking 
certificates of origin and requested the views of customs officials on their experiences of 
administering ROOs (Brenton and Imagawa, 2004).  Almost half of all respondents stated that 
overlapping agreements with differing ROO created problems, and of the respondents from 
Africa, more than two-thirds agreed with the statement that overlapping ROO were problematic. 
In addition, there are issues of integrity.  The existence of different rates of import duty 
from different countries provides incentives for false invoicing, so as to show origin in the 
country subject to lower duties.  Also, situations at the border may arise that are open to abuse or 
subject to excessive bureaucracy, thereby inflicting costs on traders in addition and beyond those 
related to compliance with the applicable ROO regulations. 
3. ACCESS TO GLOBAL MARKETS 
Even taking into account that official statistics do not reflect informal trade with 
neighboring countries, the majority of Uganda‟s imports and exports are undertaken with trade 
partners outside the region.  The conditions under which Ugandan traders can overcome their 
disadvantage of being landlocked and access international markets is, hence, important.  On the 
import side, Uganda has been operating a relative liberal trade policy and even after the EAC-
induced tariff increases, the country remains one of the more open economies in Eastern and 
Southern Africa.  Hence, access to imports is not a major problem, with the exception of some 
sensitive products that face high special tariffs. 
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On the export side, the situation is more complex.  Uganda‟s total world export market 
share is small and amounts to less than 0.01 per cent.  Moreover, many of Uganda‟s traditional 
export products, such as coffee, tea, tobacco and cotton, have shown below average world market 
export growth during the early 2000s, so that the country‟s established export sectors are 
shrinking in relative terms.  In this context, diversification into new export products with more 
dynamic demand in overseas markets is of central importance in order to maintain and enhance 
export performance. 
 
Indeed, Uganda has made considerable progress in diversifying its exports.  The 
Herfindahl index of export concentration shows a declining trend both for the type of products 
exported and the foreign partner countries (Figure 5).  The shift towards more broadly based 
export products and partners was particularly pronounced during the second half of the 1990s, but 
appears to be continuing. 
Figure 5: Concentration of Exports, 1995-2004 
(Herfindahl index) 
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Note:  The Herfindahl index H is calculated as the sum of the squares of partner country/product line 
market shares:  H = ∑i si
2
 , where si represents the share of partner country/product line i in total exports.  
Lower values imply less concentration.   
Source:  UN COMTRADE database. 
Despite this encouraging diversification trend, Uganda‟s exports remain highly 
concentrated on a limited number of commodities and partner countries.  The top-5 product lines, 
which are all commodities, accounted for more than 55 per cent of total exports.  Hence, the 
economy continues to be vulnerable to adverse developments in commodity prices in its core 
markets.   
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3.1 Trade Barriers in International Markets 
Another avenue to foster diversification is the pursuit of opportunities in previously 
underexploited markets.  In some cases, Ugandan exporters might face significant policy-
generated trade barriers that might explain their low export intensity.  The tariff barriers that 
Uganda‟s main export crops face can indeed be considerable (Table 8).  The duties claimed on 
imports of fish fillets, coffee, tea, tobacco, and cotton, which together account for more than half 
of Uganda‟s exports, tend to be particularly high in medium income countries.  For example, 
Mexico levies a 30 per cent tariff on fish fillets, India charges import duties of 100 per cent on 
coffee and tea, Sri Lanka has 75 per cent tariffs on tobacco, and China asks cotton importers to 
pay duties of 47 per cent.  Import duties on these products in industrialized countries are 
generally much lower and of a single digit magnitude, with the exception of fish and tobacco in 
the European Union, tea in Japan, and notably tobacco in the United States.  Moreover, 
industrialized countries grant least developed countries, such as Uganda, preferential market 
access (see below), so that Ugandan exporters only pay the full MFN-duties if their shipments do 
not qualify for preferential treatment, perhaps due to problems of showing compliance with rules 
of origin requirements. 
Moreover, a team of analysts in the World Bank‟s Research Department has recently 
estimated a measure of aggregate barriers faced by exporters in foreign markets (Kee, Nicita, and 
Olareagga, 2005).  This Market Access Overall Trade Restrictiveness Index (MA-OTRI) 
corresponds to the uniform tariff that if imposed by all trading partners on exports of a particular 
country would leave overall exports of that country unchanged.  The indicator aggregates 
information on tariff and non-tariff barriers, and takes unilateral, bilateral and regional market 
access preferences into account.  It is derived through econometric estimation, based on a new set 
of import demand elasticities (Kee, Nicita and Olareagga, 2004). 
For Uganda in the early 2000s, the MA-OTRI amounted to 26.8 per cent on agricultural 
exports and to 9.3 per cent on manufactured products.  For all merchandise trade, the indicator 
value was estimated as 13.9 per cent.  Among the 91 countries for which data are available, 
Uganda thereby ranks in the third of the sample that is facing relatively low tariff and non-tariff 
barrier obstacles to exports. 
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Table 8:  Simple Average of MFN Barriers on Uganda’s Main Exports  
in Potential Partner Countries, 2004 
 
Fish fillets 
(HS 0304) 
Coffee 
(HS 0901) 
Tea 
(HS 0902) 
Tobacco 
(HS 2401) 
Cotton 
(HS 5203) 
Argentina .. 11.5 .. .. .. 
Australia 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Bangladesh .. .. .. .. 0.0 
Brazil 11.5 .. .. .. .. 
Brunei .. .. .. .. 0.0 
Bulgaria .. 13.2 .. 27.5 .. 
Canada 0.0 0.0 0.0 .. 2.5 
Chile .. 6.0 6.0 .. .. 
China 13.9 13.2 15.0 10.0 47.2 
Colombia 20.0 .. .. 11.7 .. 
Croatia 10.0 6.3 .. 11.3 .. 
Cuba 10.0 .. .. .. .. 
Dominican Republic 20.0 .. .. .. 0.0 
European Union 10.9 5.3 0.8 14.5 0.0 
India .. .. 100.0 .. 30.0 
Indonesia 5.0 .. .. 5.0 5.0 
Israel 0.0 0.0 0.0 .. 0.0 
Japan 4.4 6.0 11.7 0.0 0.0 
Kenya 0.0 0.0 15.0 20.0 .. 
Macedonia .. 14.0 .. .. .. 
Mali .. .. 10.0 .. .. 
Mexico 30.0 52.4 .. 51.1 10.0 
New Zealand 0.0 3.3 0.0 .. .. 
Pakistan .. .. 17.5 25.0 .. 
Paraguay .. .. .. 14.1 .. 
Peru .. .. .. 12.0 .. 
Romania 23.2 9.0 .. 46.7 0.0 
Russian Federation 10.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 
Saudi Arabia 5.0 0.0 1.5 .. 5.0 
Senegal .. .. 10.0 5.0 .. 
Singapore 0.0  0.0 0.0  
Sri Lanka .. .. 27.5 75.0 0.0 
Switzerland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 .. 
Tunisia .. 28.3 44.0 29.0 0.0 
United States 1.0 0.0 1.6 58.3 4.8 
Vietnam .. .. .. 27.5 0.0 
Note:  (..) means that the country is not among the world‟s top-twenty importers of the respective 
commodity.  For the European Union, data for 2003 are reported and specific duties are converted into 
ad valorem equivalents.  For the Russian Federation, data for 2002 are reported. 
Source:  UNCTAD Trains database. 
 
Yet, one impediment to improved export performance that low-income countries like 
Uganda face despite relatively low average export barriers is related to the tariff structure in 
partner countries.  Many countries have escalatory tariff regimes, with low duties on raw 
materials, but higher ones on semi-processed and processed products (Figure 6).  This encourages 
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imports of unprocessed goods, often from low-income countries, which are then transformed in 
the importing country under high protection.  For the raw material exporter this tariff escalation 
means that value-addition before exports is discouraged, as processed products face high tariff 
barriers in foreign markets.  Hence, the diversification process into higher value-added production 
activities is impeded. 
Figure 6:  Tariff Escalation for Selected Products, 2004 
(MFN tariffs in per cent) 
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Note:  For the European Union, data for 2003 are reported.  The categorization of products as unprocessed, 
semi-processed and processed goods follows the MTN (Multilateral Trade Negotiations) classification of 
the World Trade Organization.  For tobacco, no semi-processed products exist in the MTN classification.   
Source:  UNCTAD Trains database. 
It should be noted that preferential access for developing countries to high-income 
country markets will tend to neutralize the effects of escalatory MFN-tariff regimes in these 
countries.  However, in many cases, rules of origin provisions on processed goods are more 
complicated or more difficult to meet than the rules on raw materials of unfinished products 
(Carrere and de Melo, 2003).  For example, it has been estimated that the costs of compliance for 
food products are more than twice as high as those for agricultural commodities (OECD, 2005). 
Such “rules of origin escalation” will tend to have qualitatively the same adverse effects on 
developing countries‟ efforts to shift into higher value-added production as tariff escalation. 
3.2 Impact of Trade Preferences in Industrialized Country Markets 
As mentioned earlier, Uganda‟s exporters benefit from reduced-tariff access to 
industrialized country markets under preferential treatment schemes, such as the Generalised 
System of Preferences (GSP), the European Union‟s Cotonou Agreement and Everything But 
Arms Initiative (EBA), and the United States‟ African Growth and Opportunities Act (AGOA).  
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The extent of duty reductions, product coverage, and rules of origin specifications differ across 
the various arrangements (Box 3), but the largest benefits in all of the arrangements accrue to 
least developed countries, like Uganda.  The potential advantages for Uganda of these preferential 
arrangements are considerable, since the country ships most of its exports to preference granting 
partners. 
The actual value of the preference schemes to individual developing countries depends on 
several factors.  Obviously, preferences are valuable only if there is a positive preference margin 
over non-eligible countries‟ supplies, that is if the importing country has non-zero MFN-duties in 
the tariff lines of interest.  Moreover, the value of preferences depends on the costs involved in 
showing compliance with rules of origin requirements.  If these costs exceed the MFN-duty, 
exporter will not bother to ask for preferential treatment, but pay the tariff.  Finally, the extent of 
benefits from preferential market access are a function of the volume of goods the country is 
allowed to export to the target market, for example under preferential tariff rate quotas.  Hence, 
three factors play a crucial role:  the available preference margin, the costs of showing 
compliance with rules of origin requirements, and quantitative limits, including those originating 
from insufficient supply capacities in the exporting country. 
In 2002, the total value to Uganda of preferential market access in the European Union, 
Japan, and the United States is estimated to amount to USD 10.5 million (Table 9), or 2.2 per cent 
of total export value (or 0.015 per cent of Uganda‟s GDP).  Almost all of these benefits are due to 
preferences in the EU market.  Most imports into the EU were thereby using ACP rather than 
EBA-preferences, due to the less strict rules of origin of the former.  The average preference 
margin obtained on all exports to the three markets amounted to 8.5 per cent.  For individual 
products, the preference margin was even more important and commercially interesting.  For 
example, for some Ugandan exports of seafood products to the EU, the preference margin 
amounted to 21 per cent of the import value. 
Overall preference utilization, that is the exports that used preferences as a share of the 
exports that were eligible for preferential treatment, amounted to more than 97 per cent.  The 
utilization rate for agricultural products was significantly higher than that for manufactures, and 
exports to the EU benefited more consistently from preferential treatment than shipments to Japan 
and the United States.  In fact, none of the exports to Japan that were eligible for preferences 
during 2002 used them.  Several reasons have been put forward to explain the under-utilisation of 
preference schemes by developing countries.  These explanations focus on the constraints of 
complying with rules of origin (Brenton and Imagawa, 2004), the costs of satisfying requirements 
related to certification, traceability  and administrative documentation (Estevadeordal and 
Suominen, 2003), and uncertainty about the applicability of individual schemes (OECD, 2005).  
The latter explanation seems to be particularly pertinent for small-scale, infrequent shipments to 
overseas markets, such as Uganda‟s exports to Japan. 
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Box 3:  Major Preferential Market Access Programs 
The Generalised System of Preferences is based on the 1979 Enabling Clause that created a 
permanent waiver to the most-favoured-nation provision in the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade.  Under GSP, selected products originating in developing countries are granted non-
reciprocal preferences in the form of reduced or zero tariff rates.  Least developed countries 
receive preferential treatment for a wider coverage of products and deeper tariff cuts.  GSP 
schemes represent unilateral preferences that differ in their design and duration across preference 
granting countries.  The following entities currently operate GSP schemes:  Australia, Belarus, 
Bulgaria, Canada, the European Community, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian 
Federation, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States of America. 
The Cotonou Agreement of 2000 between the EU and 77 African, Caribbean and Pacific 
countries provides preferential access to the EU market in addition to and beyond GSP.  The 
Agreement grew out of the Lomé Convention that governed the relations between the EU and its 
former colonies in the ACP region from 1975 until 2000.  It grants comprehensive market access 
preferences and allows partners to count the value-added in imports from other ACP countries as 
local input when determining the origin of a product (“full cumulation”).  However, the EU has 
exempted bananas, beef, and sugar from the preferential access arrangements.  The Agreement 
has been concluded for twenty years, with a clause allowing for revision every five years.  In 
2008, the present market access preferences are supposed to be replaced by arrangements to be 
agreed upon in Economic Partnership negotiations. 
The EU‟s Everything But Arms initiative of 2001 grants duty-free access to imports of all 
products from least developed countries, except to arms and munitions.  Only imports of bananas, 
rice and sugar were not fully liberalised immediately.  Duties on those products will be gradually 
reduced until duty free access will be granted for bananas in January 2006, for sugar in July 2009 
and for rice in September 2009.  In the meantime, there are duty free tariff quotas for rice and 
sugar.  The EBA provisions have been incorporated into the EU‟s GSP scheme.  The rules of 
origin of the latter allow in four regions in the Caribbean, East Asia, Latin America, and South 
Asia that intermediate inputs from regional partners are counted as local value-added, if the 
degree of prior transformation of the inputs would have conferred origin in the regional partner 
country (“diagonal cumulation”) .  Outside these regions, only imported inputs from the EU can 
be counted towards local value-added (“bilateral cumulation”).  The regulation on EBA foresees 
that the special arrangements for LDC's are to be maintained for an unlimited period of time. 
The African Growth and Opportunities Act of 2000 extends the GSP scheme of the United States 
to additional products, notably garments, from African countries that satisfy certain economic, 
social and political criteria.  A special program for countries with a gross national product per 
capita of less than 1500 US$ relaxes the otherwise strict rules of origin for apparel and allows 
qualifying countries to count yarn and fabric from anywhere in the world as local content in 
apparel assembled in their countries.  AGOA is a time-bound program that requires periodic 
renewal by the US Congress.  The special textile benefits expire in September 2007, while the 
overall program is scheduled to run until 2015. 
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Table 9:  Preference Utilization in Major Markets, 2002 
(USD and per cent) 
 Agriculture Manufacturing All Goods 
Imports into the EU, Japan and USA    
Total shipments 233 410 554 39 827 861 273 238 415 
Dutiable trade (MFN>0) 130 113 171 2 840 619 132 793 202 
Trade eligible for trade preferences 121 175 465 2 839 894 124 015 360 
Trade requesting trade preferences 120 026 100 362 475 120 388 575 
Share of eligible trade requesting preferences 99.1% 12.8% 97.1% 
Potential value of preferences 10 738 401 99 347 10 837 748 
Value of preferences actually requested 10 519 493 18 272 10 537 765 
Preference utilization rate 98.0% 18.4% 97.2% 
Potential preferential margin 8.9% 3.5% 8.7% 
Realized margin on trade eligible for preferences 8.7% 0.6% 8.5% 
Imports into the EU    
Total shipments 205 569 125 38 387 140 243 956 265 
Dutiable trade (MFN>0) 121 144 403 2 677 008 123 821 411 
Trade eligible for trade preferences 121 144 403 2 677 008 123 821 411 
Trade requesting trade preferences 120 013 594 343 095 120 356 689 
Share of eligible trade requesting preferences 99.1% 12.8% 97.2% 
Potential value of preferences 10 736 861 81 041 10 817 902 
Value of preferences actually requested 10 518 893 17 449 10 536 342 
Preference utilization rate 98.0% 21.5% 97.4% 
Potential preferential margin 8.9% 3.0% 8.7% 
Realized margin on trade eligible for preferences 8.7% 0.7% 8.5% 
Imports into Japan    
Total shipments 14 103 806 440 385 14 544 191 
Dutiable trade (MFN>0) 8 953 536 4 522 8 958 058 
Trade eligible for trade preferences 15 831 4 522 20 353 
Trade requesting trade preferences 0 0 0 
Share of eligible trade requesting preferences 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Potential value of preferences 475 167 642 
Value of preferences actually requested 0 0 0 
Preference utilization rate 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Potential preferential margin 3.0% 3.7% 3.2% 
Realized margin on trade eligible for preferences 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Imports into the USA    
Total shipments 13 737 623 1 000 336 14 737 959 
Dutiable trade (MFN>0) 15 232 159 089 13 733 
Trade eligible for trade preferences 15 232 158 364 173 596 
Trade requesting trade preferences 12 506 19 380 31 886 
Share of eligible trade requesting preferences 82.1% 12.2% 18.4% 
Potential value of preferences 1 066 18 138 19 204 
Value of preferences actually requested 600 823 1 423 
Preference utilization rate 56.3% 4.5% 7.4% 
Potential preferential margin 7.0% 11.5% 11.1% 
Realized margin on trade eligible for preferences 3.9% 0.5% 0.8% 
Notes: The value of preferences is calculated by multiplying the value of imports by the margin between 
MFN and preferential tariff rates.  For the USA, data averages for 2002 and 2003 are used. 
Source: World Bank staff based on data from the European Commission, Japan and the United States. 
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In cross-country comparison, Uganda‟s preference utilization in its main export market, 
the European Union, was very high and exceeded the rate achieved by most other countries in 
Eastern and Southern Africa (Figure 7).  Hence, Ugandan exporters seem to be able to meet the 
requirements for preferential treatment on a consistent basis.  There might, of course, be cases in 
which the market access conditions are so demanding that exporters do not (or no longer) try to 
serve the European market, but direct their supplies elsewhere right away.  But given the 
relatively high preference utilization rates, lack of domestic supply capacities might well be more 
of a constraint to export growth than barriers in the European market. 
 
Figure 7: Preference Utilization Rates in the EU Agriculture and Food Market, 2002 
(Per cent of eligible, non-zero duty trade that received preferences) 
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Source:  OECD, 2005. 
 
Since 2002, there has been one important shift in Uganda‟s preference utilization.  This 
change concerns apparel exports to the United States under AGOA.  Uganda has qualified for 
AGOA preferences since October 2000 and became eligible for the special apparel benefits under 
the program in October 2001.  Since then, apparel exports to the United States have been growing 
very dynamically, increasing from zero in 2002 to more than USD 4 million in 2004 (Table 10).  
The expansionary trend continued into 2005, despite a more competitive international apparel 
market environment following the phase-out of quantitative restrictions on textile and clothing 
exports under the Multi-fibre Arrangement.   
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Table 10:  US Imports from Uganda, 2002-2005 
(„000 USD) 
 2002 2003 2004 
2004 
(Jan-Jun) 
2005 
(Jan-Jun) 
Total US Imports from Uganda 15 229 36 392 30 957 17 170 14 967 
- Non-AGOA 15 165 33 374 20 663 11 914 10 579 
- AGOA 32 1 509 5 147 2 628 2 194 
-Agriculture 13 30 1 008 1 008 15 
- Textiles 0 1 433 4 009 1 585 2 162 
- Other  19 46 130 35 17 
Source:  United States Department of Commerce. 
 
However, it is unclear whether Uganda has a comparative advantage in apparel 
production, given the scarcity of locally produced yarn and fabric that is of appropriate quality 
and competitively priced.  Current exports to the United States make use of the special, very 
liberal rules of origin requirements under AGOA, which allow Ugandan exporters to utilize low-
cost fibre from Asian suppliers in their US-bound production.  If these rules were tightened, as 
seems likely with the termination of the special rule for lesser developed countries in September 
2007, it is questionable whether the Ugandan apparel export industry would remain viable. 
The Government of Uganda (GOU) has actively tried to encourage companies to exploit 
opportunities under AGOA and has extended considerable political and financial support to the 
apparel export industry in its efforts to serve the US market.  There have been recent press reports 
(“Ugandan Company to Export Steel to US”, The Monitor, Oct. 17th, 2005) that GOU is also 
supportive of attempts to launch stainless steel exports to the US in order to benefit from AGOA.  
A steel plant is reported to have invested USD 10 million to upgrade and expand its facilities in 
order to satisfy US quality standards.  Ugandan exports would benefit from a preference margin 
of about 30 per cent on their stainless steel shipments under AGOA, which is considerable.  
However, steel production is a very capital intensive activity, so that it is unclear whether Uganda 
has a long-term comparative advantage over other competitors in steel production and whether 
there would be any significant employment creation effect from the investments. 
 
3.3 Negotiations of an Economic Partnership Agreement 
Many of the preference granting programs that benefit developing countries are limited in 
duration and are subject to periodic review.  As a result of such a review, the EU‟s preferences for 
its ACP partners were renewed in the Cotonou Agreement of 2000.  At the same time, it was 
decided to amend the relationship between the EU and ACP countries and change the existing 
trade preferences from non-reciprocal to reciprocal in order to ensure full compliance with 
provisions under the WTO agreement.  The conclusion of the intended economic partnership 
agreements (EPAs) is likely to have major impacts on the ACP countries (Hinkle and Schiff, 
2004). 
The EPA negotiations started in 2004 and are supposed to conclude by the end of 2007.  
In order to facilitate the negotiation process and to enhance the development impact of the 
agreements through increased intra-regional trade, the EU intends the EPAs to be signed with free 
trade areas or customs unions rather than individual countries.  All countries in Eastern and 
Southern Africa are involved in the EPA process, except Egypt, Somalia and South Africa.  Since 
early 2004, two country groupings for the negotiations have established themselves:  the ESA-
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EPA group of 16 COMESA members and the SADC-EPA group of seven SADC members 
(Figure 3).  However, neither of the two negotiating groups corresponds in its composition 
exactly to the existing RTAs.  Of the seven countries that are members of both COMESA and 
SADC, five have opted to negotiate in the context of ESA-EPA and two as part of SADC-EPA.  
As a member of COMESA but not SADC, Uganda has naturally joined the ESA-EPA group. 
Yet, even though negotiations with the EU in the two groupings are already ongoing, the 
regional configuration remains an issue for discussion and concern.  This is because Tanzania has 
opted to negotiate as part of SADC-EPA, while its EAC partners Kenya and Uganda are members 
of ESA-EPA.  Unless the two negotiating tracks are closely coordinated, differences in 
commitments vis-à-vis the EU could emerge among the EAC partners that would make the 
implementation of the EPAs within the existing EAC customs union cumbersome and costly.  
Moreover, if SADC-EPA and ESA-EPA were to pursue deeper regional integration in the context 
of the existing regional configuration and form free trade areas or customs unions, there would be 
overlap within the existing EAC and these two new integration initiatives (that is SADC-EPA and 
ESA-EPA) that could lead to contradictory requirements and large-scale trade deflection.  How 
these problems would eventually best be dealt with is difficult to assess at this stage, but their 
emergence could be largely if not entirely be avoided if Tanzania could be convinced to switch 
negotiating groups.  This change might entail for Tanzania to rejoin COMESA, which given the 
country‟s withdrawal from the agreement as recently as 2000 would involve significant political 
costs.  But by making the switch, Tanzania would not only avoid substantial trade transactions 
costs for itself from trade deflection and cumbersome customs administration, but would also do 
a service to its neighbors by clearing the way to advance the region‟s economic integration aims.   
The prospective EPA agreement will not improve the preference margins that countries 
like Uganda currently enjoy in the EU market.  As a least developed country, Uganda is eligible 
for duty and quota free access to the EU market under the EBA initiative, which is of unlimited 
duration.  However, the EBA rules of origin are more restrictive than those under the Cotonou 
Agreement, notably by not allowing “full” regional cumulation.  The GOU, therefore, might aim 
in the EPA negotiations to obtain rules of origin provisions that are at least as favorable as those 
currently enjoyed under Cotonou.  And if it were possible to negotiate more favorable 
specifications that confer origin based, for example, on a simple change of tariff heading or a low 
value-added rule, additional market access opportunities for Ugandan exporters would open up. 
On the imports side, reciprocity means that over a twelve year transition period from 
2008 to 2020, Uganda would have to open its market to supplies from EU members.  This market 
opening will have the typical effects of preferential trade liberalization, bringing benefits from 
trade creation, increased competition and lower consumer prices at the expense of costs related to 
trade diversion and loss of tariff revenue.  To date, there are no studies available for the East 
Africa region that try to quantify the impacts of the prospective EPAs and assess how the benefits 
and costs measure up overall.  Analysis of a prospective EPA in West Africa finds that imports 
from the EU would increase by 5-20 per cent and that trade creation would exceed trade diversion 
(Busse and Großmann, 2004).  There would be significant, adverse impacts on tariff revenues, 
though, with duty collection in most countries dropping by 40-60 per cent. 
For Uganda, tariff revenues on imports from EU members accounted for about 15 per 
cent of total duty collection in 2004 (Figure 8).  This share represents the lower boundary of the 
prospective border tax losses following the full implementation of a prospective EPA.  Actual 
duty losses will be higher, as the preferential market access granted to the EU will tend to lead to 
a replacement of imports from other countries by duty-free EU supplies.  Revenue losses will be 
attenuated to the extent that certain “sensitive” products were to be exempted from the 
liberalization process. 
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Figure 8: Estimate of Tariff Revenue Shares according to Origin of Imports, 2004 
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Note: Estimates include applicable import duty (MFN or preferential), import commission, and excise duty, 
but no value-added taxes on imports. Import exemptions are not taken into account due to lack of data.  
Source:  World Bank staff based on data from UN Comtrade and UNCTAD Trains. 
The coverage of the EPA negotiations is a priori not limited to the goods sector, but 
might also embrace services.  This part of the negotiations could provide opportunities for GOU 
to request the relaxation of current EU restrictions on temporary migration, allowing more 
workers from Uganda to take up short-term employment in EU countries.  The overseas workers 
would not only relieve pressure in the domestic labor market and gain a higher income 
themselves, but would possibly trigger a broader development process at home through transfers 
of remittances and know-how.  GOU might also use the EPA negotiations to lock in and advance 
reforms of its domestic services sector.   
 
3.4 Multilateral Trade Negotiations 
While preferential trade liberalization can be advantageous, some objectives can be better 
achieved at the multilateral level.  In particular, adverse effects from trade diversion are avoided, 
the complexity of trade regulations is reduced, and better market access can be achieved in 
countries that are unwilling to engage in preferential agreements.  Moreover, highly sensitive 
issues, such as agricultural subsidy reductions in industrialized countries, can only be effectively 
addressed in a multilateral form.  The multilateral trading system also provides a legal framework 
that treats all members equally, irrespective of their economic status.  Uganda has recognized 
these advantages and has been participating in multilateral negotiations as a founding member of 
the WTO. 
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Early on there have been fears that multilateral trade liberalization, as agreed in the 
Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, would erode the existing preferences for Ugandan 
exporters in industrialized country markets and thereby deteriorate the export prospects of the 
country (Atkinson, 1999).  But subsequent analysis suggests that the impact of multilateral 
liberalization on Uganda appears to have been quite slight, and on balance positive, largely 
because there have only been very small impacts on the world prices of the agricultural 
commodities that the country exports (Blake, McKay, and Morissey, 2001).  And some local 
analysts see a successful conclusion of the current Doha Round of multilateral negotiations as a 
prime opportunity for Uganda to advance its export interests by contributing to increased 
transparency, stronger commodity prices, and expanded trade in world markets (Abdalla and 
Egesa, 2005). 
The impact of the Doha Round on Uganda will, of course, depend on the outcome of the 
negotiations.  Recent model-based analysis of the economic effects of alternative Doha trade 
liberalization scenarios suggests that Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) could more than proportionally 
gain from multilateral reform, but that countries will need to take a proactive stance in the 
negotiations to secure a positive outcome (Anderson, Martin, and van der Mensbrugghe, 2005).  
Opening agricultural markets in industrialized countries is projected to result in large benefits for 
poor African countries, but the reductions in tariffs, domestic support and export subsidies need 
to be ambitious.  Exempting even just a few “sensitive” or “special” products could reduce hugely 
the gains from reform, since these products are likely to be the tariff peak items.   
Expanding non-agricultural market access at the same time as reforming agriculture is 
equally important for SSA.  Such reforms in manufacturing and services, including in developing 
countries, are needed in order to improve the prospects of concessions by industrialized countries 
concerning agriculture, and to obtain greater efficiency gains in SSA.  The latter are important to 
offset the terms of trade losses suffered either by net food importers or by recipients of tariff 
preferences.  South-South concessions in the form of own reforms also are needed for developing 
countries to get the most out of the Doha round.  Since developing countries are trading quite 
intensively with each other, they would be the major beneficiaries of reforms by other developing 
countries. 
How would Uganda‟s trade regime be affected by an ambitious outcome of the Doha 
round?  Uganda currently has tariff bindings in 815 out of 5028 tariff lines (Table 11).  Its bound 
rates, as well as those of its EAC partners, are generally well above the applied tariffs, so that 
significant binding overhang exists.  Hence, Uganda could offer in the Doha negotiations to 
significantly expand its binding coverage and reduce bound rates, without necessarily facing 
major adjustments in its trade regime and domestic economy.  Further reductions in EAC external 
trade barriers might be desirable in order to reap benefits from a more open trade regime, but such 
a liberalization would likely not be forced on Uganda and its EAC partners by Doha, but remain 
in its extent and timing subject to unilateral policy decisions. 
 
Table 11:  WTO Tariff Bindings of EAC Members 
Country Number of bound tariff lines Minimum binding (%) Maximum binding (%) 
Kenya 748 18 100 
Tanzania 755 120 120 
Uganda 815 40 80 
Source:  WTO Consolidated Tariff Schedules database. 
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4. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POLICY REFORM AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
This study described and assessed Uganda‟s trade policy situation at a critical point in 
time, i.e. just after joining the EAC customs union.  It thereby identified a number of issues that 
need to be addressed in order to make better use of Uganda‟s trade potential.  A set of policy 
reform priorities and technical assistance needs that emerges from the preceding discussion is 
developed and presented in Table 12. 
 
Table 12:  Policy Reform and Technical Assistance Matrix 
Policy 
issue 
Action recommended 
Requirements 
Agency 
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Time frame 
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Access to regional markets       
 Establish a time-table for the phase-out of 
special tariffs on “sensitive products”. 
 X  MTTI Medium term 
 Ask during the review of the CET for a 
reduction in the top rate from 25 to 20 per cent. 
 X  MTTI Longer term 
 Push for simple, non-restrictive rules of origin 
specifications in regional agreements. 
 X  MTTI Longer term 
 Pursue deeper regional integration through 
harmonization of trade standards and behind-
the-border regulations 
 X  MTTI Longer term 
 Aim for flexibility within RTAs, including 
COMESA, to avoid contradictory requirements. 
 X  MTTI Longer term 
 Undertake year-round monitoring of informal 
cross-border transactions to improve statistics. 
  X UBOS Medium term 
       
Access to global markets       
 Use EPA negotiations to obtain more favorable 
rules of origin for access to the EU market 
 X  MTTI/MoF Medium term 
 Push for reductions in tariff peaks and tariff 
escalation in international trade negotiations. 
 X  MTTI/MFA Longer term 
 Take proactive stance in Doha Round by 
offering own concessions (e.g. extention of 
tariff bindings and bound tariff cuts) in 
exchange for substantial reforms of world 
agricultural trade. 
 X  MTTI/MFA Medium term 
       
Note:  Agency abbreviations:  MTTI – Ministry of Tourism, Trade and Industry; MoF – Ministry of Finance, 
Planning and Economic Development; MFA – Ministry of Foreign Affairs; UBOS – Uganda Bureau of Statistics. 
Time frame:  Short term – within 12 months  Medium term – within 2 years  Longer term – 2 to 5 years. 
Source:  World Bank Staff. 
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ANNEX:  UGANDA AND THE COMESA FREE TRADE AREA 
There are opportunities for further integration within the existing COMESA framework.  
Uganda is taking part in COMESA‟s tariff reduction program and currently grants an 80 per cent 
reduction to imports from other members that are at the same stage of intra-regional trade 
liberalization.  In other words, the tariffs it charges on imports from these COMESA countries are 
only one fifth of MFN-rates.  Conversely, these other members charge one fifth of their MFN-
duties on Ugandan exports. 
 
However, since not all countries are equally advanced in their intra-regional tariff 
reduction efforts (Annex Table), different tariff regimes apply to Uganda‟s trade with it‟s 
COMESA partners.  Tariff reductions under the COMESA program are applied in a reciprocal 
manner, so that countries that have been more progressive in their tariff liberalization and are 
already participating in the COMESA-FTA, such as Rwanda and Sudan, are granting the 80 per 
cent reductions on their MFN-tariffs to imports from Uganda that the latter is offering them 
(while allowing free trade with fellow COMESA-FTA members).  COMESA members that have 
moved slower in their intra-regional tariff reduction programs charge higher tariffs (and 
conversely receive a smaller tariff reduction on their exports to Uganda).  For example, Ethiopia 
applies a 10 per cent reduction in tariffs to its COMESA trading partners, so that Ugandan 
exporters that want to enter the Ethiopian market pay 90 per cent of the MFN-rates on their 
shipments.  Angola, DR Congo, and Seychelles apply their full MFN duties to Ugandan exports. 
 
Annex Table:  Trade Relationships among COMESA Members 
Rate of Duty Reduction COMESA country 
100%  
(COMESA-FTA) 
Burundi, Djibouti, Egypt, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Rwanda, Sudan, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
80% Comoros, Eritrea, Uganda 
10% Ethiopia  
Nil Angola, DR Congo, Seychelles 
Under derogation Swaziland 
Source:  COMESA Secretariat. 
 
Uganda aims to join the COMESA free trade area, and according to the COMESA 
Secretary General, corresponding consultations on FTA-accession are already under way.
1
  FTA 
membership would simplify trade procedures and lower tariffs with countries like Rwanda and 
Sudan, and, hence, make it easier for Ugandan exporters to reach regional markets.  Some 
observers claim that exports to Sudan could double if free trade were instituted.
2
  But the GOU 
has indicated that it needed more time to study the effects of a complete elimination of tariffs.  It 
has also requested that a compensatory mechanism for losses of tariff revenue be established and 
that safeguard measures to soften the impact of potential import surges be implemented. 
 
Yet, given that official imports from COMESA-FTA members other than Kenya, with 
which Uganda is already in the process of practicing free trade under EAC provisions, account for 
less than 1 per cent of Uganda‟s total imports and that these imports already occur at reduced 
tariff rates, the prospective impacts of joining the COMESA-FTA on tariff revenues and the 
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2
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economy at large seem rather limited.  Moreover, two COMESA-FTA members, notably Burundi 
and Rwanda, are expected to accede to the EAC during 2006, even though the exact timetable and 
procedures, including possible transitional arrangements, remain to be determined.
3
  The rationale 
for Uganda to stay outside the COMESA-FTA is further weakened under these circumstances and 
the GOU should consider to advance its integration with COMESA and join the FTA in order to 
maximize the benefits from regional trade. 
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 “Rwanda, Burundi join EAC in March,” The New Times, 10 February 2006. 
